Government Essay

Report of the Electoral Commission

In its report the Commission indicated that the underlying principles in party vote thresholds could no longer stand the test of time. It became quite clear that the thresholds were basically meant to enhance effective governance in Parliament through substantial representation of the people. In this regard, certain aspects of this provision that do not appear to be in line with these principles should be corrected. For instance, it was recommended that the party vote threshold ought to be lowered from the current five to four percent. This is based on the understanding that 5% is a little too high for certain parties that should otherwise be accorded representation in Parliament. However, the review should not be done with speed, but over a period of three general elections. The fundamental argument of the Commission was that a 5% threshold was a little too high. On the other hand, it maintained that a figure less than 4% would risk fragmenting the institution of Parliament to the extent that it becomes too hard to govern. In this respect, it was apparent that 4% was not only ideal, but would also help in stabilizing the government.  

The Commission also proposed that the one electoral seat threshold should be abolished alongside the provision for overhand seats. In its argument, the Commission held that these legal provisions would unfairly award parties’ seats in Parliament. Indeed, it was keen on sealing any loopholes in the electoral laws that appeared to favor certain section of the society at the expense of others. According to the report, the overhang seats come into the fore when a party garners more votes than it is necessary to secure a share of the seats. In the past, this law has effectively inflated representation in Parliament from the normal 120 to 122. It becomes imperative that such situations should be prevented so that representation in Parliament remains fair and proportionate. It goes without mentioning that abolishing the law will solve most of these ambiguities.

The One Electorate Seat Threshold

The Commission has forwarded several arguments for and against the idea. For instance, the argument that a party which has secured an electorate seat should qualify for allocation of list of seats has been forwarded to ensure that the party remains vibrant within Parliament. This certainly sounds good for parties that wish to deliver on their electoral pledges to the electorate. In addition, the one electorate seat threshold would essentially eliminate situations where only a single MP belongs to a particular party. It goes without saying that the law was meant to give parties the voice in Parliament so that each party can influence the policy making. Another reason that has been given for retention of this law is based on the argument it is usually difficult for aspirants on small parties to actually emerge winners in elections. Thus, parties that manage to secure the least of seats should be boosted from the party list. Although this brings some sense of affirmative action, it would be grossly unfair to big parties given that they also put a lot of effort to win electoral seats against stiff competition from other big parties. It will essentially amount to rewarding parties that do not work hard to win seats while ignoring those that do (Abbott, 1901).  

The arguments for abolition of the provision basically site fidelity to the underlying principles as the greatest reason to abolish. Basically, there is a concession that the provisions no longer serve the original purpose and thus should be discarded. This is because the current generation may just lose confidence in the electoral system if they feel that certain sections are promoting injustice, given that most of them will not care to understand the circumstances under which these laws were made. As a matter of fact, it should be clear from the onset that all votes are given equal value before the law. By appearing to favor small parties on account of their performance in Parliament, the Commission would essentially be implying that votes cast for small parties are superior to votes cast for big parties. This should never be the case, especially with regard to the modern democracy. Understandably, this is the reason the Commission is so keen on abolishing this law as soon as possible before public confidence on it begins to erode. This is significant given that once public confidence is eroded; it is always difficult to win it back.

Personal Opinion

It goes without mentioning that some of the arguments forwarded by the Commission are very relevant to representation. They need to be thoroughly looked into with a view to slightly modifying them to fit into the social context. For instance, it is quite clear that the thresholds were basically meant to enhance effective governance in Parliament through substantial representation of the people. The fact that they no longer serve this purpose should send the law makers back to the drawing board so that they can come up with an idea that will take care of the current population dynamics. It will not make a lot of sense to insist on implementing an idea that no longer serves its intended purpose. For one, it will cause people to start doubting the legitimacy of the entire system given that only a few people will refer to its initial background (Abbott, 1901).

It is difficult to understand that a figure of 4% would be more acceptable than 5% in terms of party vote thresholds. To most people, it would appear that there is no significant difference between the two figures. This is the basis of temptation to dismiss this proposal of the Electoral Commission. However, it is essential to note that there should be a formula for awarding these representations that will still uphold the principle of fairness and good governance. In this regard, there should be general concession that this idea should be scrapped altogether instead of reducing the percentages. As a result, it should be replaced with another provision where a fixed number of seats is allocated for parties to share based on their Parliamentary strength. Although small parties are likely to miss out in sharing the seats, it will remain in line with the principle of equity and justice (Bongard, 1986). Arguably, parties that manage to secure the least of seats should be boosted from the party list. Although this brings some sense of affirmative action, it would be grossly unfair to big parties given that they also put a lot of effort to win electoral seats against stiff competition from other big parties.  

In conclusion, the voting system was carefully reviewed by the Commission and proper recommendations made in a manner that would cater for fairness in Parliamentary democracy. In its report, the Commission indicated that the underlying principles in party vote thresholds could no longer stand the test of time. In addition, the Commission also proposed that the one electoral seat threshold should be abolished alongside the provision for overhand seats. In its argument, the Commission held that these legal provisions would unfairly award parties’ seats in Parliament and therefore no longer sustainable. It goes without mentioning that some of the arguments forwarded by the Commission are very relevant to representation. However, it is essential to note that there should be a formula for awarding these representations that will still uphold the principle of fairness and good governance. Basically, the arguments for abolition of the provision site fidelity to the underlying principles as the greatest reason to abolish. This should be given serious considerations, especially considering that the Commission needs to command the confidence of the general public.